Preface |
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ix | |
About the Authors |
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xiii | |
Reason in Law |
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xv | |
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What Legal Reasoning Is, and Why It Matters |
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1 | (20) |
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An Overview of Law and Politics |
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1 | (3) |
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4 | (3) |
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A Definition of Legal Reasoning |
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7 | (5) |
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Sources of Official Legal Texts |
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12 | (2) |
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The Choices That Legal Reasoning Confronts |
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14 | (2) |
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16 | (3) |
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19 | (2) |
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Change and Stability in Legal Reasoning |
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21 | (14) |
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Sources of Unpredictibility in Law |
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23 | (12) |
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The Disorderly Conduct of Words |
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23 | (1) |
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The Unpredictability of Precedents |
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24 | (1) |
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Reasoning by Example in General |
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24 | (1) |
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24 | (1) |
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The Three-Step Process of Reasoning by Example |
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25 | (1) |
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How Reasoning by Example Perpetuates Unpredictability in Law |
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25 | (1) |
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An Illustration of Unpredictability in Law |
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26 | (1) |
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Reasoning by Example Facilitates Legal Change |
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27 | (1) |
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Is Unpredictability in Law Desirable? |
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28 | (1) |
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The Other Side of the Coin: Stare Decisis as a Stabilizing and Clarifying Element in Law |
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28 | (3) |
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31 | (3) |
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Questions about the Cases |
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34 | (1) |
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35 | (33) |
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35 | (4) |
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Reasoning by Example in Common Law |
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39 | (9) |
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40 | (4) |
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44 | (1) |
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45 | (3) |
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Keeping the Common-Law Tradition Alive |
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48 | (10) |
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Making Common Law without Close Precedents |
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49 | (3) |
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Horizontal Stare Decisis in Common Law |
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52 | (1) |
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Rightly Adhering to Precedent Because the Need for Stability and Reliance is Present |
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52 | (3) |
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Wrongly Adhering to Precedent When Stability Is Unnecessary |
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55 | (3) |
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The Common-Law Tradition Today |
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58 | (7) |
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65 | (2) |
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67 | (1) |
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68 | (36) |
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68 | (3) |
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Four Misguided Approaches to Statutory Interpretation |
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71 | (12) |
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Literalism: Sticking to the Words |
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72 | (1) |
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73 | (2) |
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Canons of Statutory Construction |
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75 | (3) |
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78 | (1) |
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Other Words in the Statute |
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79 | (1) |
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The Expressed Intent of Individual Legislators and Committee Reports |
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80 | (1) |
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Other Actions, Events, and Decisions in the Legislature |
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80 | (1) |
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The Perils of Legislative Intent |
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81 | (2) |
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Purpose: The Key to Wise Statutory Interpretation |
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83 | (8) |
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The Centrality of Statutory Purpose |
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84 | (1) |
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Determining Purpose: Words Can Help |
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85 | (1) |
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Determining Purpose: The Audience |
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86 | (1) |
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Determining Purpose: The Assumption of Legislative Rationality and the Uses of Legislative History |
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86 | (1) |
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Illustrations of Statutory Purpose |
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87 | (1) |
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87 | (1) |
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The Case of the Lady Jurors, or Why Legislative Intent Does Not Determine Statutory Purpose |
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88 | (1) |
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Statutory Purpose in the Cases of Criminal Commerce: Caminetti, McBoyle, and Alpers |
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88 | (2) |
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90 | (1) |
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Stare Decisis in Statutory Interpretation |
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91 | (9) |
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Major League Baseball, Haviland's Dog and Pony Show, and Government Regulation of Business |
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92 | (5) |
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The Case against Increased Adherence to Precedent in Statutory Interpretation |
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97 | (3) |
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A Summary Statement of the Appropriate Judicial Approach to Statutory Interpretation |
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100 | (1) |
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101 | (2) |
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103 | (1) |
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Interpreting the United States Constitution |
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104 | (23) |
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``The Supreme Law of the Land'' |
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105 | (3) |
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Conventional Legal Reasoning in Constitutional Interpretation |
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108 | (4) |
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Words as Channels of Meaning |
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108 | (2) |
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Original Intent and Purpose |
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110 | (2) |
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112 | (1) |
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Judicial Review and Democratic Theory |
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112 | (8) |
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Theories of Judicial Self-Restraint |
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114 | (3) |
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Political Constraints on the Court |
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117 | (3) |
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The Turn to Individual Dignity |
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120 | (1) |
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121 | (5) |
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126 | (1) |
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127 | (31) |
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Legal Reasoning as Liberal Justification |
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127 | (10) |
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127 | (2) |
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129 | (1) |
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130 | (4) |
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The Value of Impartiality |
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134 | (2) |
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136 | (1) |
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Legal Reasoning as a Public Language |
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137 | (17) |
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Law and Moralistic Communities: The Mann Act Revisited |
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139 | (4) |
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Law in Conditions of Diversity: Emerging Issues of Gay Rights |
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143 | (11) |
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154 | (1) |
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155 | (3) |
Appendix A: Introduction to Legal Procedure and Terminology |
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158 | (5) |
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158 | (1) |
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159 | (4) |
Appendix B: Bush v. Gore |
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163 | (21) |
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163 | (1) |
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164 | (4) |
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168 | (13) |
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181 | (2) |
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Conclusion: Why Legal Reasoning Matters |
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183 | (1) |
Credits |
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184 | (1) |
Index |
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185 | (4) |
Index of Cases |
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189 | |