Preface |
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xi | |
About the Authors |
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xiii | |
Reason in Law |
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xv | |
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What Legal Reasoning Is, and Why It Matters |
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1 | (20) |
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An Overview of Law and Politics |
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1 | (4) |
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2 | (1) |
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The Rule of Law Keeps the Peace |
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3 | (1) |
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The Critical Importance of Judicial Impartiality |
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3 | (2) |
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5 | (3) |
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A Definition of Legal Reasoning |
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8 | (1) |
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Legal Reasoning Does Not Discover the ``One Right Answer'' |
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9 | (1) |
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The Structure of Legal Reasoning |
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9 | (4) |
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10 | (1) |
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10 | (1) |
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11 | (1) |
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11 | (2) |
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Sources of Official Legal Texts |
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13 | (1) |
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The Choices that Legal Reasoning Confronts |
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14 | (2) |
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16 | (4) |
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20 | (1) |
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Change and Stability in Legal Reasoning |
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21 | (15) |
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Sources of Unpredictability in Law |
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23 | (5) |
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The Disorderly Conduct of Words |
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23 | (1) |
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The Unpredictability of Precedents |
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24 | (4) |
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Is Unpredictability in Law Desirable? |
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28 | (1) |
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Vertical and Horizontal Stare Decisis: A Stabilizing and Clarifying Element in Law |
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29 | (2) |
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31 | (4) |
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Questions about the Cases |
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35 | (1) |
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36 | (32) |
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36 | (2) |
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Reasoning by Example in Common Law |
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38 | (10) |
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40 | (4) |
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44 | (1) |
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45 | (3) |
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Keeping the Common-Law Tradition Alive |
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48 | (11) |
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Making Common Law without Close Precedents |
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49 | (4) |
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Horizontal Stare Decisis in Common Law |
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53 | (6) |
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The Common-Law Tradition Today |
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59 | (5) |
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64 | (3) |
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67 | (1) |
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68 | (38) |
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68 | (3) |
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Four Misguided Approaches to ``First Instance'' Statutory Interpretation |
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71 | (13) |
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Literalism: Sticking to the Words |
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72 | (2) |
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74 | (2) |
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Canons of Statutory Construction |
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76 | (2) |
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78 | (6) |
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Purpose: The Key to Wise Statutory Interpretation |
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84 | (7) |
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The Centrality of Statutory Purpose |
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85 | (1) |
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Determining Purpose: Words Can Help |
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86 | (1) |
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Determining Purpose: The Audience |
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86 | (1) |
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Determining Purpose: The Assumption of Legislative Rationality and the Uses of Legislative History |
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87 | (1) |
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Illustrations of Statutory Purpose |
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87 | (4) |
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91 | (1) |
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Stare Decisis in Statutory Interpretation |
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91 | (10) |
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Major League Baseball, Haviland's Dog and Pony Show, and Government Regulation of Business |
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93 | (5) |
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The Case against Increased Adherence to Precedent in Statutory Interpretation |
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98 | (3) |
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A Summary Statement of the Appropriate Judicial Approach to Statutory Interpretation |
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101 | (1) |
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101 | (4) |
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105 | (1) |
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Interpreting the United States Constitution |
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106 | (28) |
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``The Supreme Law of the Land'' |
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107 | (4) |
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Conventional Legal Reasoning in Constitutional Interpretation |
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111 | (5) |
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Words as Channels of Meaning |
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111 | (3) |
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Original Intent and Purpose |
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114 | (1) |
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115 | (1) |
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Judicial Review and Democratic Theory |
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116 | (8) |
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Theories of Judicial Self-Restraint |
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118 | (3) |
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Political Constraints on the Court |
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121 | (3) |
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The Turn to Individual Dignity |
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124 | (1) |
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125 | (6) |
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131 | (3) |
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134 | (24) |
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134 | (2) |
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Three Threats to the Rule of Law |
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136 | (6) |
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136 | (2) |
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Attacks on Judicial Legitimacy |
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138 | (2) |
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140 | (2) |
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The Rule of Law as Liberal Justification |
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142 | (16) |
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142 | (1) |
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143 | (1) |
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144 | (4) |
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The Value of Impartiality |
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148 | (2) |
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150 | (5) |
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155 | (3) |
Appendix: Introduction to Legal Procedure and Terminology |
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158 | (5) |
Credits |
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163 | (2) |
Index |
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165 | (6) |
Index of Cases |
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171 | |