Foreword |
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xvii | |
Preface |
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xix | |
About the Author |
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xxxi | |
About the Contributors |
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xxxiii | |
PART I INTRODUCTION TO NETWORK SECURITY MONITORING |
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Chapter 1 The Security Process |
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3 | (22) |
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4 | (2) |
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6 | (3) |
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6 | (2) |
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8 | (1) |
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9 | (1) |
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9 | (3) |
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Security Principles: Characteristics of the Intruder |
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12 | (2) |
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Some Intruders Are Smarter Than You |
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12 | (1) |
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Many Intruders Are Unpredictable |
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12 | (1) |
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Prevention Eventually Fails |
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13 | (1) |
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Security Principles: Phases of Compromise |
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14 | (6) |
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15 | (1) |
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16 | (1) |
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17 | (1) |
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18 | (1) |
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18 | (2) |
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Security Principles: Defensible Networks |
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20 | (4) |
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Defensible Networks Can Be Watched |
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20 | (1) |
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Defensible Networks Limit an Intruder's Freedom to Maneuver |
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21 | (2) |
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Defensible Networks Offer a Minimum Number of Services |
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23 | (1) |
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Defensible Networks Can Be Kept Current |
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23 | (1) |
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24 | (1) |
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Chapter 2 What Is Network Security Monitoring? |
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25 | (20) |
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25 | (3) |
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Collection, Analysis, and Escalation |
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28 | (1) |
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Detecting and Responding to Intrusions |
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29 | (1) |
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Why Do IDS Deployments Often Fail? |
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30 | (1) |
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Outsiders versus Insiders: What Is NSM's Focus? |
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31 | (3) |
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Security Principles: Detection |
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34 | (3) |
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Intruders Who Can Communicate with Victims Can Be Detected |
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35 | (1) |
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Detection through Sampling Is Better Than No Detection |
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35 | (1) |
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Detection through Traffic Analysis Is Better Than No Detection |
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36 | (1) |
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Security Principles: Limitations |
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37 | (3) |
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Collecting Everything Is Ideal but Problematic |
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37 | (1) |
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Real Time Isn't Always the Best Time |
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38 | (1) |
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39 | (1) |
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40 | (2) |
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NSM Is Not Device Management |
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40 | (1) |
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NSM Is Not Security Event Management |
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40 | (1) |
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NSM Is Not Network-Based Forensics |
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41 | (1) |
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NSM Is Not Intrusion Prevention |
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41 | (1) |
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42 | (1) |
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43 | (2) |
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Chapter 3 Deployment Considerations |
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45 | (58) |
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Threat Models and Monitoring Zones |
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45 | (6) |
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48 | (1) |
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49 | (1) |
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50 | (1) |
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50 | (1) |
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Accessing Traffic in Each Zone |
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51 | (34) |
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52 | (4) |
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56 | (7) |
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63 | (13) |
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76 | (9) |
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85 | (8) |
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93 | (5) |
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94 | (2) |
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96 | (2) |
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98 | (4) |
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99 | (1) |
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100 | (1) |
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Out-of-Band Remote Access |
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101 | (1) |
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102 | (1) |
PART II NETWORK SECURITY MONITORING PRODUCTS |
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103 | (242) |
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Chapter 4 The Reference Intrusion Model |
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105 | (14) |
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105 | (1) |
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106 | (12) |
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118 | (1) |
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Chapter 5 Full Content Data |
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119 | (54) |
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120 | (1) |
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121 | (1) |
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122 | (18) |
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124 | (1) |
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Using Tcpdump to Store Full Content Data |
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125 | (1) |
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Using Tcpdump to Read Stored Full Content Data |
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126 | (6) |
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Timestamps in Stored Full Content Data |
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132 | (2) |
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Increased Detail in Tcpdump Full Content Data |
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134 | (1) |
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Tcpdump and Berkeley Packet Filters |
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135 | (5) |
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140 | (9) |
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140 | (1) |
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Using Tethereal to Store Full Content Data |
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141 | (3) |
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Using Tethereal to Read Stored Full Content Data |
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144 | (2) |
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Getting More Information from Tethereal |
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146 | (3) |
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149 | (5) |
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Basic Usage of Snort as Packet Logger |
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149 | (3) |
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Using Snort to Store Full Content Data |
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152 | (1) |
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Using Snort to Read Stored Full Content Data |
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153 | (1) |
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Finding Specific Parts of Packets with Tcp dump, Tethereal, and Snort |
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154 | (8) |
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162 | (9) |
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162 | (2) |
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Using Ethereal to Read Stored Full Content Data |
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164 | (3) |
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Using Ethereal to Rebuild Sessions |
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167 | (2) |
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169 | (2) |
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A Note on Commercial Full Content Collection Options |
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171 | (1) |
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172 | (1) |
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Chapter 6 Additional Data Analysis |
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173 | (38) |
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173 | (1) |
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174 | (5) |
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179 | (3) |
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182 | (3) |
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185 | (4) |
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189 | (2) |
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191 | (2) |
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193 | (12) |
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193 | (3) |
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What Do Raw Trace Files Look Like? |
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196 | (9) |
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205 | (4) |
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209 | (2) |
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211 | (36) |
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212 | (2) |
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214 | (6) |
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220 | (2) |
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222 | (2) |
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224 | (8) |
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225 | (4) |
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229 | (3) |
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232 | (2) |
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234 | (8) |
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236 | (2) |
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238 | (4) |
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242 | (4) |
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246 | (1) |
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Chapter 8 Statistical Data |
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247 | (38) |
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What Is Statistical Data? |
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248 | (1) |
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249 | (6) |
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255 | (2) |
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257 | (1) |
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258 | (2) |
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260 | (4) |
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264 | (2) |
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266 | (5) |
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271 | (7) |
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278 | (5) |
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283 | (2) |
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Chapter 9 Alert Data: Bro and Prelude |
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285 | (32) |
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286 | (12) |
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287 | (5) |
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Interpreting Bro Output Files |
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292 | (5) |
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Bro Capabilities and Limitations |
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297 | (1) |
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298 | (17) |
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299 | (8) |
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Interpreting Prelude Output Files |
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307 | (2) |
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309 | (2) |
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Using PIWI to View Prelude Events |
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311 | (2) |
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Prelude Capabilities and Limitations |
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313 | (2) |
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315 | (2) |
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Chapter 10 Alert Data: NSM Using Sguil |
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317 | (28) |
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318 | (1) |
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319 | (2) |
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The Basic Sguil Interface |
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321 | (2) |
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Sguil's Answer to "Now What?" |
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323 | (6) |
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Making Decisions with Sguil |
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329 | (2) |
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Sguil versus the Reference Intrusion Model |
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331 | (13) |
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SHELLCODE x86 NOOP and Related Alerts |
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332 | (7) |
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FTP SITE Overflow Attempt Alerts |
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339 | (1) |
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340 | (2) |
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MISC MS Terminal Server Request Alerts |
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342 | (2) |
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344 | (1) |
PART III NETWORK SECURITY MONITORING PROCESSES |
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345 | (58) |
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Chapter 11 Best Practices |
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347 | (38) |
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347 | (2) |
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348 | (1) |
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349 | (5) |
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350 | (1) |
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351 | (1) |
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351 | (3) |
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354 | (26) |
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355 | (5) |
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360 | (11) |
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371 | (6) |
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377 | (3) |
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380 | (3) |
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Short-Term Incident Containment |
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381 | (1) |
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Emergency Network Security Monitoring |
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381 | (2) |
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383 | (1) |
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383 | (1) |
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384 | (1) |
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Chapter 12 Case Studies for Managers |
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385 | (18) |
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Introduction to Hawke Helicopter Supplies |
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385 | (1) |
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Case Study 1: Emergency Network Security Monitoring |
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386 | (7) |
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386 | (2) |
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System Administrators Respond |
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388 | (1) |
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389 | (1) |
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Conducting Incident Response |
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389 | (1) |
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Incident Response Results |
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390 | (3) |
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Case Study 2: Evaluating Managed Security Monitoring Providers |
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393 | (3) |
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394 | (1) |
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394 | (2) |
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396 | (1) |
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Case Study 3: Deploying an In-House NSM Solution |
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396 | (6) |
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Partner and Sales Offices |
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398 | (1) |
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398 | (1) |
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398 | (1) |
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399 | (1) |
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"But Who Shall Watch the Watchers?" |
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399 | (2) |
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401 | (1) |
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402 | (1) |
PART IV NETWORK SECURITY MONITORING PEOPLE |
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403 | (116) |
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Chapter 13 Analyst Training Program |
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405 | (28) |
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410 | (4) |
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410 | (1) |
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410 | (2) |
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412 | (2) |
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414 | (1) |
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414 | (1) |
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414 | (1) |
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415 | (1) |
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415 | (3) |
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415 | (1) |
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416 | (1) |
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416 | (2) |
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Scripting and Programming |
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418 | (3) |
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418 | (1) |
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419 | (1) |
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419 | (2) |
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421 | (1) |
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421 | (1) |
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421 | (1) |
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421 | (1) |
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422 | (4) |
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Periodicals and Web Sites |
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426 | (1) |
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Case Study: Staying Current with Tools |
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427 | (4) |
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431 | (2) |
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Chapter 14 Discovering DNS |
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433 | (40) |
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434 | (14) |
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Normal Port 53 UDP Traffic |
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434 | (8) |
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Normal Port 53 TCP Traffic |
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442 | (6) |
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Suspicious Port 53 Traffic |
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448 | (11) |
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Suspicious Port 53 UDP Traffic |
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448 | (7) |
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Suspicious Port 53 TCP Traffic |
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455 | (4) |
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Malicious Port 53 Traffic |
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459 | (13) |
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Malicious Port 53 UDP Traffic |
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459 | (7) |
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Malicious Port 53 TCP and UDP Traffic |
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466 | (6) |
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472 | (1) |
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Chapter 15 Harnessing the Power of Session Data |
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473 | (18) |
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474 | (1) |
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Session Data from the Wireless Segment |
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475 | (1) |
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Session Data from the DMZ Segment |
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476 | (3) |
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Session Data from the VLANs |
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479 | (9) |
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Session Data from the External Segment |
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488 | (2) |
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490 | (1) |
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Chapter 16 Packet Monkey Heaven |
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491 | (28) |
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491 | (7) |
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498 | (7) |
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505 | (13) |
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518 | (1) |
PART V THE INTRUDER VERSUS NETWORK SECURITY MONITORING |
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519 | (142) |
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Chapter 17 Tools for Attacking Network Security Monitoring |
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521 | (62) |
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521 | (9) |
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530 | (4) |
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534 | (14) |
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548 | (10) |
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558 | (9) |
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Cisco IOS Denial of Service |
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567 | (3) |
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Solaris Sadmin Exploitation Attempt |
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570 | (5) |
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Microsoft RPC Exploitation |
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575 | (5) |
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580 | (3) |
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Chapter 18 Tactics for Attacking Network Security Monitoring |
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583 | (68) |
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584 | (19) |
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Attack from a Stepping-Stone |
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584 | (5) |
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Attack by Using a Spoofed Source Address |
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589 | (8) |
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Attack from a Netblock You Don't Own |
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597 | (2) |
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Attack from a Trusted Host |
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599 | (1) |
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Attack from a Familiar Netblock |
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600 | (1) |
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Attack the Client, Not the Server |
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601 | (1) |
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Use Public Intermediaries |
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602 | (1) |
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603 | (31) |
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604 | (3) |
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Distribute Attacks Throughout Internet Space |
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607 | (11) |
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618 | (16) |
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634 | (5) |
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Degrade or Deny Collection |
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639 | (8) |
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639 | (2) |
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641 | (2) |
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643 | (4) |
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Separate Analysts from Their Consoles |
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647 | (1) |
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Self-Inflicted Problems in NSM |
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647 | (2) |
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649 | (2) |
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Epilogue The Future of Network Security Monitoring |
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651 | (10) |
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Remote Packet Capture and Centralized Analysis |
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652 | (1) |
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Integration of Vulnerability Assessment Products |
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653 | (1) |
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654 | (2) |
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656 | (2) |
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658 | (3) |
PART VI APPENDIXES |
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661 | (104) |
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Appendix A Protocol Header Reference |
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663 | (22) |
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Appendix B Intellectual History of Network Security Monitoring |
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685 | (72) |
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Appendix C Protocol Anomaly Detection |
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757 | (8) |
Index |
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765 | |