Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics

by Norman Schofield , Itai Sened

ISBN13: 9780521450355

ISBN10: 0521450357

Format: Hardcover

Pub. Date: 2006-07-31

Publisher(s): Cambridge University Press

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Summary

This book adapts a formal model of elections and legislative politics to study party politics in Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States. The approach uses the idea of valence, that is, the party leader's non-policy electoral popularity, and employs survey data to model these elections. The analysis explains why small parties in Israel and Italy keep to the electoral periphery. In the Netherlands, Britain, and the US, the electoral model is extended to include the behavior of activists. In the case of Britain, it is shown that there will be contests between activists for the two main parties over who controls policy. For the recent 2005 election, it is argued that the losses of the Labour party were due to Blair's falling valence. For the US, the model gives an account of the rotation of the locations of the two major parties over the last century.

Author Biography

Norman Schofield is the William Taussig Professor in Political Economy at Washington University in St. Louis Itai Sened is professor and chair of the Department of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis

List of Tables and Figures

xiii

Preface

xix

1 Multiparty Democracy

(10)

1.1 Introduction

(7)

1.2 The Structure of the Book

(2)

1.3 Acknowledgments

(1)

2 Elections and Democracy

(26)

2.1 Electoral Competition

(2)

2.2 Two-Party Competition under Plurality Rule

(2)

2.3 Multiparty Representative Democracy

(2)

2.4 The Legislative Stage

(3)

2.4.1 Two-Party Competition with Weakly Disciplined Parties

(1)

2.4.2 Party Competition under Plurality Rule

(1)

2.4.3 Party Competition under Proportional Representation

(1)

2.4.4 Coalition Bargaining

(1)

2.5 The Election

(1)

2.6 Expected Vote Maximization

(2)

2.6.1 Exogenous Valence

(1)

2.6.2 Activist Valence

(1)

2.6.3 Activist Influence on Policy

(1)

2.7 Selection of the Party Leader

(2)

2.8 Example: Israel

(7)

2.9 Electoral Models with Valence

(2)

2.10 The General Model of Multiparty Politics

(3)

2.10.1 Policy Preferences of Party Principals

(1)

2.10.2 Coalition and Electoral Risk

(3)

3 A Theory of Political Competition

(33)

3.1 Local Equilibria in the Stochastic Model

(10)

3.2 Local Equilibria under Electoral Uncertainty

(5)

3.3 The Core and the Heart

(6)

3.4 Example: The Netherlands

(3)

3.5 Example: Israel

(3)

3.6 Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3.1

(3)

4 Elections in Israel, 1988-1996

(31)

4.1 An Empirical Vote Model

(14)

4.2 Comparing the Formal and Empirical Models

(4)

4.3 Coalition Bargaining

(3)

4.4 Conclusion: Elections and Legislative Bargaining

(2)

4.5 Appendix

(4)

5 Elections in Italy, 1992-1996

101

(27)

5.1 Introduction

101

(1)

5.2 Italian Politics Before 1992

102

(3)

5.3 The New Institutional Dimension: 1991-1996

105

(5)

5.4 The 1994 Election

110

(6)

5.4.1 The Pre-Election Stage

110

(2)

5.4.2 The Electoral Stage

112

(1)

5.4.3 The Coalition Bargaining Game

113

(3)

5.5 The 1996 Election

116

(8)

5.5.1 The Pre-Election Stage

117

(3)

5.5.2 The Electoral Stage

120

(3)

5.5.3 The Coalition Bargaining Game

123

(1)

5.6 Conclusion

124

(2)

5.7 Appendix

126

(2)

6 Elections in the Netherlands, 1979-1981

128

(23)

6.1 The Spatial Model with Activists Jr

128

(3)

6.2 Models of Elections with Activists in the Netherlands

131

(11)

6.3 Technical Appendix: Computation of Eigenvalues

142

(3)

6.4 Empirical Appendix

145

(6)

7 Elections in Britain, 1979-2005

151

(24)

7.1 The Elections of 1979, 1992, and 1997

152

(7)

7.2 Estimating the Influence of Activists

159

(4)

7.3 A Formal Model of Vote-Maximizing with Activists

163

(5)

7.4 Activist and Exogenous Valence

168

(2)

7.5 Conclusion

170

(2)

7.6 Technical Appendix

172

(3)

7.6.1 Computation of Eigenvalues

172

(1)

7.6.2 Proof of Theorem 7.1

173

(2)

8 Political Realignments in the United States

175

(24)

8.1 Critical Elections in 1860 and 1964

175

(5)

8.2 A Brief Political History, 1860-2000

180

(5)

8.3 Models of Voting and Candidate Strategy

185

(4)

8.4 A Joint Model of Activists and Voters

189

(4)

8.5 The Logic of Vote Maximization

193

(2)

8.6 Dynamic Local Equilibria

195

(2)

8.7 Appendices

197

(2)

9 Concluding Remarks

199

(10)

9.1 Assessment of the Model

199

(1)

9.2. Proportional Representation

200

(6)

9.2.1 The Election of September 2005 in Germany

201

(1)

9.2.2 Recent Changes in the Israel Knesset

202

(4)

9.3 Plurality Rule

206

(1)

9.4 Theory and Empirical Evidence

207

(2)

References

209

(10)

Index

219

Multiparty Democracy: Elections and Legislative Politics

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