Intention

by Anscombe, G. E. M.

Edition: 2nd

ISBN13: 9780674003996

ISBN10: 0674003993

Format: Paperback

Pub. Date: 2000-10-16

Publisher(s): Harvard Univ Pr

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Summary

Intention is one of the masterworks of twentieth-century philosophy in English. First published in 1957, it has acquired the status of a modern philosophical classic. The book attempts to show in detail that the natural and widely accepted picture of what we mean by an intention gives rise to insoluble problems and must be abandoned. This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.

Author Biography

G. E. M. Anscombe is Professor of Philosophy, Emerita, at the University of Cambridge.

The subject introduced under three heads: expression of intention for the future, intentional action, and intention in acting
Intuitive understanding of the difference between 'prediction' and 'expression of intention' rejected as a foundation for a philosophical account of expressions of intention
Prediction defined so as to comprise orders and expressions of intention as well as estimates of the future
The falsity of expressions of intention in the simple future tense (a) as lying and (b) as falsity because the intention is not carried out
Usefulness of considering the verbal expression of intention for the future in order to avoid various dead ends
Uselessness of an introspective explanation of intention
Expressions of intentions distinguished from estimates of the future by the justification, if any, given for them
Are there any statements of the form 'A intends X' which can be made with fair certainty? Descriptions of a man's actions often descriptions truly substitutable for 'X ' in 'A intends X'
Reasons why we suppose a man the sole authority on his own intentions
Intentional actions defined as those to which a certain sense of the question 'Why?' is given application
Difficulty of defining the relevant sense and danger of moving in a circle in our explanations of 'reason for acting' and 'action'
'I knocked the cup off the table because I was startled' gives an answer to a question 'Why?' about something done
The question 'Why?' is refused application by the answer 'I did not know I was doing that'
The same action can have many descriptions, in some of which the agent knows it and in some not
The question also refused application when the action was involuntary; but this notion cannot be introduced without treating as solved the very kind of problem we are discussing
Difficulties of the notion 'involuntary'
'Non-observational knowledge' introduced as e.g. the knowledge one has of some of one's own movements
There is also non-observational knowledge of the causation of a movement, as when I say why I gave a start
We can define one class of involuntary movements without begging any questions, as the class of movements known without observation, but where there is no room for non-observational knowledge of causality: e.g. the muscular spasm one sometimes has in dropping off to sleep
In one sense of 'Why?' the answer mentions evidence; but an answer to a question 'Why?' about an action, which does not mention evidence, does not therefore necessarily give a reason for acting
The cases where it was difficult to distinguish a cause from a reason turn out to be ones where there is non-observational knowledge of the causation
This kind of causation labelled 'mental causality'
Mental causes should be distinguished from motives of actions and objects of feelings
And also from intentions with which a person acts, even though these may be expressed in the form 'I wanted...' Mental causality is not important in itself, but it is important to make these distinctions
Motives have been sharply distinguished from intentions by philosophers, and described as causes
Popularly motive and intention are not so distinct; but 'motive' is a wider notion than' intention'
A motive is not a cause at all
Among motives that are not intentions for the future we can distinguish between backward-looking motives like revenge (I killed him because he killed my brother) and motive-in-general (He did it out of friendship)
Motive-in-general can also be called 'interpretative' motive
What distinguishes backward-looking motives from mental causes? The notions of good and harm are involved in them
In some cases the distinction between a mental cau
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