Globalization and Emerging Issues in Trade Theory and Policy
by Tran-Nam, BinhRent Textbook
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Summary
Table of Contents
| List of Contributors | p. v |
| Introduction | p. xv |
| Trade Liberalization and Outsourcing | p. 1 |
| The Wto and the World Economy: A Welfare-Theoretic Perspective | p. 3 |
| Introduction | p. 3 |
| Preliminaries: Welfare comparison | p. 4 |
| WTO and FTA | p. 7 |
| Labor and environmental policies | p. 9 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 11 |
| Acknowledgement | p. 13 |
| References | p. 13 |
| Trade Liberalization As a Game of Decision Under Uncertainty | p. 15 |
| Overview | p. 15 |
| The Model | p. 16 |
| The behavioral rules | p. 17 |
| The game of tariff war: Johnson (1953-1954) | p. 18 |
| Tariff reform as a decision problem under uncertainty? | p. 20 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 25 |
| Acknowledgements | p. 27 |
| References | p. 27 |
| Comparative Advantage and Trade Liberalization in a Chamberlinian-Ricardian Model | p. 29 |
| Introduction | p. 29 |
| The model | p. 31 |
| The impact of trade liberalization | p. 33 |
| Acknowledgements | p. 34 |
| References | p. 35 |
| Outsourcing and Import Restriction Policies | p. 37 |
| Introduction | p. 37 |
| The model | p. 39 |
| Intermediate sectors | p. 40 |
| Policies to control outsourcing | p. 44 |
| Welfare of country N | p. 45 |
| Quantitative restriction | p. 45 |
| Variety restriction | p. 48 |
| The tariff policy | p. 51 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 54 |
| Acknowledgement | p. 54 |
| References | p. 54 |
| Liberalization of Government Procurements: Competition From Foreign Firms | p. 57 |
| Introduction | p. 57 |
| The model | p. 60 |
| Domestic firms, foreign firms, and domestic welfare | p. 60 |
| Optimization by individual firms | p. 61 |
| Properties of Nash equilibriums of the lobbying game | p. 63 |
| Properties of equilibrium strategies | p. 65 |
| Entry of a foreign firm | p. 65 |
| Effects of foreign entry on welfare | p. 69 |
| Mean-preserving spreads | p. 71 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 72 |
| Acknowledgement | p. 72 |
| References | p. 73 |
| Trading Clubs and Preferential Trade Agreements | p. 75 |
| Normative Comparisons of Customs Unions and Other Types of Free Trade Association | p. 77 |
| Introduction | p. 77 |
| Analysis | p. 79 |
| Extensions of Theorem 2 | p. 81 |
| Non-passive non-members | p. 81 |
| Public goods | p. 82 |
| Summarizing and cautionary remarks | p. 82 |
| Acknowledgements | p. 84 |
| Appendix: The extended Kemp-Wan FTA | p. 84 |
| References | p. 85 |
| A Free Trade Area and Its Neighbor's Welfare: A Revealed Preference Approach | p. 87 |
| Introduction | p. 87 |
| Model | p. 89 |
| Main results | p. 91 |
| Interpretation of the condition for the non-existence of Pareto-improving PTA | p. 94 |
| Government interventions and the effect of a PTA | p. 96 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 97 |
| Acknowledgement | p. 98 |
| References | p. 98 |
| Tariff Adjustments in Preferential Trade Agreements | p. 101 |
| Introduction | p. 102 |
| A symmetric three-country trade model | p. 103 |
| Tariffs and the terms of trade | p. 107 |
| Tariffs and member country welfare | p. 114 |
| Conclusion | p. 118 |
| Acknowledgement | p. 119 |
| References | p. 119 |
| More (Or Less) On Necessarily Welfare-Enhancing Free Trade Areas | p. 121 |
| Introduction | p. 121 |
| The Ohyama-Panagariya-Krishna result | p. 123 |
| The OPK proposition | p. 123 |
| An objection | p. 125 |
| A numerical simulation | p. 130 |
| Background | p. 130 |
| Simulation results | p. 131 |
| Conclusion | p. 136 |
| Acknowledgement | p. 136 |
| Appendix | p. 136 |
| References | p. 137 |
| Pareto-Improving Trading Clubs Without Income Transfers | p. 139 |
| Introduction | p. 139 |
| The model and equilibrium conditions | p. 142 |
| The first main result: Pareto-improving non-discriminatory reform | p. 143 |
| The second main result: Pareto-optimal customs unions without income transfers | p. 146 |
| A diagrammatic exposition | p. 149 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 154 |
| Acknowledgements | p. 155 |
| Proof of Lemma 1 | p. 156 |
| Cases of specific tariffs and ad valorem tariffs imposed on all goods | p. 157 |
| Specific tariffs | p. 157 |
| Ad valorem tariffs | p. 160 |
| References | p. 161 |
| Trade and Welfare | p. 163 |
| The Contribution of Murray Kemp to the Discipline of International Trade and Welfare Economics | p. 165 |
| Introduction | p. 165 |
| How Murray Kemp came to economic theory | p. 167 |
| Murray Kemp's major contributions to trade and welfare economics | p. 170 |
| Kemp and welfare economics | p. 170 |
| Kemp and exhaustible and renewable resources | p. 172 |
| Kemp and international trade | p. 173 |
| Kemp as a discipline builder and his contributions to economic methodology | p. 179 |
| Conclusion | p. 185 |
| Acknowledgement | p. 185 |
| References | p. 185 |
| The Gains From Trade and Refusal to Trade | p. 193 |
| Introduction | p. 194 |
| The individual and gains from trade | p. 195 |
| Domestic and foreign trade | p. 196 |
| A Ricardian economy | p. 196 |
| A more general model with asymmetric income sources | p. 196 |
| The feasibility of free-trade consensus | p. 198 |
| The evolutionary case for free trade | p. 199 |
| Political economy and refusal to allow free trade | p. 200 |
| The second-best view | p. 201 |
| Strategic trade policy and rent seeking | p. 201 |
| Trade liberalization | p. 202 |
| Trade diversion: The second-best within political economy | p. 202 |
| International externalities and refusal to trade | p. 203 |
| Other explanations for refusal to trade | p. 205 |
| Conclusions | p. 205 |
| Acknowledgement | p. 206 |
| References | p. 206 |
| A Two-Country Model of International Trade with Increasing Returns and Oligopoly | p. 209 |
| Introduction | p. 209 |
| An autarkic equilibrium | p. 211 |
| Free trade equilibria | p. 214 |
| Trade patterns | p. 219 |
| Gains from trade | p. 220 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 224 |
| Acknowledgements | p. 225 |
| Some properties of the allocation curve | p. 225 |
| The factor price equalization condition | p. 227 |
| References | p. 228 |
| Tariff Policy and Foreign Economic Aid for the Economy with a Monopolistically Competitive Nontraded Industry and Capital Inflow | p. 231 |
| Introduction | p. 232 |
| The model | p. 233 |
| The effects of import tariffs and foreign economic aid | p. 236 |
| Comparative static analysis of the effects of import tariffs and foreign economic aid | p. 236 |
| The welfare effects of import tariff and foreign economic aid | p. 239 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 241 |
| Acknowledgements | p. 242 |
| References | p. 242 |
| Infrastructure Aid and Deindustrialization in Developing Countries | p. 245 |
| Introduction | p. 246 |
| Assumptions and the basic properties of the model | p. 247 |
| Short-term effect of infrastructure investment on production costs | p. 248 |
| Factor prices, price of the nontraded good, and the exchange rate | p. 248 |
| Infrastructure aid to the export sector | p. 250 |
| Infrastructure aid to the import sector | p. 251 |
| Infrastructure aid to the nontraded good sector | p. 251 |
| Infrastructure aid, welfare, and deindustrialization | p. 252 |
| Infrastructure aid and national income | p. 252 |
| Sectoral outputs and deindustrialization | p. 255 |
| Infrastructure aid to the export sector and deindustrialization | p. 257 |
| Infrastructure aid to the import sector and deindustrialization | p. 260 |
| Infrastructure aid to the nontraded good sector and deindustrialization | p. 263 |
| Concluding remarks | p. 265 |
| References | p. 266 |
| Environmental Regulations for a Small Open Economy with Tourism | p. 269 |
| Introduction | p. 270 |
| A model | p. 271 |
| Optimal tariff and pollution tax | p. 274 |
| Tariffs | p. 275 |
| Pollution taxes | p. 277 |
| Jointly optimal tariffs and pollution taxes | p. 278 |
| Simulations | p. 279 |
| Specifications | p. 279 |
| Calibrations | p. 280 |
| Simulations | p. 281 |
| Conclusions | p. 282 |
| Acknowledgements | p. 282 |
| References | p. 283 |
| Subject Index | p. 285 |
| Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved. |
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