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1 | (17) |
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3 | (5) |
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Anti-natalism and the pro-natal bias |
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8 | (5) |
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13 | (3) |
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16 | (2) |
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Why Coming into Existence Is Always a Harm |
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18 | (42) |
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Can coming into existence ever be a harm? |
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18 | (10) |
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Lives worth living and lives not worth living |
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20 | (2) |
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Lives worth starting and lives worth continuing |
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22 | (6) |
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Why coming into existence is always a harm |
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28 | (32) |
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The asymmetry of pleasure and pain |
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30 | (10) |
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Comparing existing with never existing |
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40 | (9) |
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49 | (8) |
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Against not regretting one's existence |
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57 | (3) |
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How Bad Is Coming into Existence? |
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60 | (33) |
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Why life's quality is not the difference between its good and its bad |
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61 | (3) |
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Why self-assessments of one's life's quality are unreliable |
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64 | (5) |
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Three views about the quality of life, and why life goes badly on all of them |
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69 | (19) |
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70 | (3) |
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Desire-fulfilment theories |
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73 | (8) |
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81 | (6) |
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Concluding comments about the three views |
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87 | (1) |
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88 | (5) |
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Having Children: The Anti-Natal View |
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93 | (39) |
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93 | (9) |
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94 | (1) |
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Is there a duty not to procreate? |
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95 | (7) |
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102 | (11) |
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Understanding the purported right |
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102 | (2) |
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Grounding the right on autonomy |
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104 | (1) |
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Grounding the right on futility |
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105 | (1) |
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Grounding the right on disagreement |
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106 | (2) |
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Grounding the right on reasonable disagreement |
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108 | (5) |
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Disability and wrongful life |
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113 | (11) |
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The non-identity problem and the disability rights objection distinguished |
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114 | (1) |
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The `social construction of disability' argument |
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115 | (2) |
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The `expressivist' argument |
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117 | (1) |
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Responding to the disability rights arguments |
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118 | (4) |
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122 | (2) |
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Assisted and artificial reproduction |
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124 | (4) |
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Reproductive ethics and sexual ethics |
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125 | (2) |
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The tragedy of birth and the morals of gynaecology |
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127 | (1) |
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Treating future people as mere means |
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128 | (4) |
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Abortion: The `Pro-Death' View |
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132 | (31) |
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135 | (5) |
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Which interests are morally considerable? |
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140 | (4) |
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When does consciousness begin? |
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144 | (4) |
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Interests in continued existence |
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148 | (4) |
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152 | (3) |
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155 | (5) |
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160 | (3) |
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Population and Extinction |
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163 | (38) |
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165 | (3) |
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Solving problems in moral theory about population |
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168 | (14) |
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Professor Parfit's population problems |
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168 | (4) |
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Why anti-natalism is compatible with Theory X |
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172 | (6) |
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178 | (4) |
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182 | (12) |
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When decreasing population decreases quality of life |
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182 | (4) |
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Reducing population to zero |
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186 | (8) |
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194 | (7) |
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195 | (1) |
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Three concerns about extinction |
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196 | (5) |
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201 | (26) |
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Countering the counter-intuitiveness objection |
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202 | (6) |
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Responding to the optimist |
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208 | (3) |
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211 | (10) |
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221 | (2) |
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Misanthropy and philanthropy |
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223 | (4) |
Bibliography |
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227 | (8) |
Index |
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235 | |